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Intelligence analysts engage in information seeking, evaluation, prediction, 
and reporting behavior in an extremely information-intensive work environment.  
A Cognitive Task Analysis (CTA) was conducted on intelligence analysts to 
capture data that will provide input to support development of a computational 
model of the analyst's processes and analytic strategies.  A hybrid method was 
used to conduct the CTA, including a modified version of the critical decision 
method.  Participants were asked to describe an example of a critical analysis 
assignment where they had to collect, analyze, and produce a report on 
intelligence of a strategic nature.  Procedures used to conduct the CTA are 
described in this chapter along with initial results.  Several factors contribute to 
making the analyst's task challenging: (i) time pressure, (ii) a high cognitive 
workload, and (iii) difficult human judgments.  Human judgments are involved in 
considering the plausibility of information, deciding what information to trust, and 
determining how much weight to place on specific pieces of data.  Intelligence 
analysis involves a complex process of assessing the reliability of information 
from a wide variety of sources and combining seemingly unrelated events.  This 
problem is challenging because it involves aspects of data mining, data 
correlation and human judgment. 
 
 




In this chapter we describe research involving a Cognitive Task Analysis (CTA) 
with intelligence analysts, in line with one of the themes of this book, namely, strategies 
used by experts who are confronted with tough scenarios and unusual tasks.  We 
present what we have learned regarding how experienced practitioners deal with the 
extremely challenging task of intelligence analysis by summarizing a set of ten CTA 
interviews conducted with intelligence analysts to identify leverage points for the 
development of new technologies.   
The challenges facing practitioners in the modern world where expertise gets 
"stretched" by dynamics and uncertainty, a second them for this book, also characterize 
the problems experienced by intelligence analysts.  Part of the effort reported in this 
chapter is aimed at building up an empirical psychological science of analyst 
knowledge, reasoning, performance, and learning.  We expect this will provide a 
scientific basis for design insights for new analyst technologies.  In addition, this 
psychological research should yield task scenarios and benchmark tasks that can be 





An ability to sort through enormous volumes of data and combine seemingly 
unrelated events to construct an accurate interpretation of a situation and make 
predictions about complex, dynamic events represents the hallmark of the intelligence 
analysts (IA's) job.  These volumes of data typically represent an extensive and far-
ranging collection of sources, and are represented in many different formats (e.g., 
written and oral reports, photographs, satellite images, maps, tables of numeric data, to 
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name a few).  As part of this process, the analyst must make difficult judgments to 
assess the relevance, reliability, and significance of these disparate pieces of 
information.  Intelligence analysis also involves performing complex reasoning 
processes such as inferential analysis, to determine "the best explanation for uncertain, 
contradictory and incomplete data" (Patterson, Roth, & Woods, 2001, p. 225).   
The nature of the data, the complex judgments and reasoning required, and a 
sociotechnical environment that is characterized by high workload, time pressure, and 
high stakes combine to create an extremely challenging problem for the intelligence 
analyst.  High levels of uncertainty are associated with the data, when "deception is the 
rule."  Since the validity of the data is always subject to question, this impacts the 
cognitive strategies used by analysts (Johnson, 2004).  Moreover, the complex 
problems to be analyzed entail complex reasoning, including abductive1, deductive2 , 
and inductive3 reasoning.  Finally, high stakes are associated with the pressure not to 
miss anything and to provide timely, actionable analysis.  Potentially high consequences 
for failure — where analysis products have a significant impact on policy — also 
contribute to make the task challenging as decisionmakers, senior policy makers, and 
military leaders use the products of analysis to make high-stakes decisions involving 
national security.  
A number of reports have emerged that provide normative or prescriptive views 
on intelligence analysis.  There have been very few that provide empirical, descriptive 
                                                 
1 Abductive reasoning is used to determine the best explanation (Josephson & Josephson, 1994) where if 
the match between data and an explanation is more plausible than any other explanation it is accepted as 
the likely explanation (Klein, this volume).  
2 Deductive reasoning involves deriving a conclusion by logical deduction; inference in which the 
conclusion follows the premises.  
3 Inductive reasoning employs logical induction where the conclusion, though supported by the premises, 
does not follow from them necessarily. 
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studies of intelligence analysis.  It is likely that there are many CTA studies of 
intelligence analysis that will never become part of the public literature because of the 
classified nature of the work involved.  Despite the spottiness of available literature, 
what does exist reveals that intelligence analysis is a widely variegated task domain. 
This means that it is important to be careful in making generalizations from any 
circumscribed types of intelligence tasks or types of analysts. It is equally important not 
to be daunted by the vastness of the domain, and to start the investigative venture 
somewhere. 
Intelligence analysis is commonly described as a highly iterative cycle involving 
requirements (problem) specification, collection, analysis, production, dissemination, 
use, and feedback.  It is an event-driven, dynamic process that involves viewing the 
information from different perspectives in order to examine competing hypotheses and 
develop an understanding of a complex issue.  The critical role of the human is to add 
"value" to original data by integrating disparate information and providing an 
interpretation (Krizan, 1999).  This integration and interpretation entails difficult, complex 
judgments to make sense of the information obtained.  This "dis-aggregation and 
synthesis of collected and created evidence includes sorting out the significant from the 
insignificant, assessing them severally and jointly, and arriving at a conclusion by the 
exercise of judgment: part induction, part deduction, and part abduction." (Millward, 
1993, in Moore, 2003).   
Warning-oriented intelligence includes supporting the need for senior 
policymakers to not be surprised (Bodnar, 2003).  Analysts need to "provide detailed 
enough judgments — with supporting reporting — so that both the warfighter and the 
policymaker can anticipate the actions of potential adversaries and take timely action to 
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support US interests" (ibid., p. 6).  For example, the analyst needs to make predictions 
regarding what the adversary has the capability to do and how likely it is that he will act.  
These predictions need to include what actions can be taken to change, or respond to 
these actions, and the probable consequences of those actions (ibid.).  
Table 1 presents an analysis of problem types that Krizan derives from Jones (1995) and 
course work at the Joint Military Intelligence College.  A range of problem types, from simplistic 
to indeterminate, are explicated by characterizing each level of the problem along several 
dimensions, such as type of analytic task, analytic method, output, and probability of error.   
Table 1.  Intelligence Analysis Problem Types (Krizan, 1999). 
 
Taxonomy of Problem Types 
Source: Analysis course material, Joint Military Intelligence College, 1991 
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 Figure 1 presents another way of characterizing the domain of intelligence analysis 
developed by Cooper.  Along one axis there are various types of intelligence, along a second are 
different accounts (topics), and along a third axis are different types of products. The different 
types of intelligence (or “sources”) are functionally organized into: 
! human source intelligence (HUMINT), which includes field agents, 
informants, and  observers (attaches), 
! imagery intelligence (IMINT), which includes photo, electro-optical, 
infrared, radar, and multispectral imagery from sources such as satellites, 
!  signals intelligence (SIGINT), which includes communications, electronic, 
and telemetry, 
!  measurement and signatures intelligence (MASINT), which includes 
acoustic and  radiation signals, 
! open source intelligence (OSINT), which includes public documents, 
newspapers, journals, books, television, radio, and the World Wide Web, 
and 
!  all-source intelligence, which involves all of the above. 
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Source: J. Cooper SAIC
 
Figure 1.  Types of Intelligence, Domains, Functions, and Products. 
 
 Domains (or topics) may address terrorism, military, politics, science and 
technology (S&T), or economics.  Product types range from those that are close to the 
raw data, through those that involve increasing amounts of analysis that may eventually 
lead to national-level estimates and assessments.  As in any hierarchically organized 
information system, this means that information is filtered and recoded as the analysis 
process progresses from lower to higher levels. 
Techniques to Enhance Processing of Intelligence Data 
Recent world events have focused attention on some of the inherent challenges 
involved in performing intelligence analysis (viz., The 9/11 Commission Report).  As a 
result, increased research is being conducted to develop new training, tools, and 
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techniques that will enhance the processing of intelligence data.  As one example, 
support and training in the organizing and piecing together aspects of intelligence 
analysis and decision making has been identified by the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration (OASD/NII) Research 
Program as an area that is greatly in need of more basic and applied research.  One 
current research thread that seeks to address this need is the Novel Information from 
Massive Data (NIMD) program where the goal is to develop an “information manager” to 
assist analysts in dealing with the high volumes and disparate types of data that 
inundate intelligence analysts.  The NIMD research program seeks to develop 
techniques that “structure data repositories to aid in revealing and interpreting novel 
contents" and techniques that can accurately model and draw inferences about (1) rare 
events and (2) sequences of events (widely and sparsely distributed over time).  
Connable (2001) asserts that the intelligence process would be well served by 
enhancing the ability to leverage open sources, particularly since open sources provide 
the Intelligence Community with between 40-80% of its usable data (Joint Military 
Intelligence Training Center, 1996).  As an example, one of our study participants, who 
worked on a strategic analysis assignment regarding the question of whether President 
Estrada, of the Philippines, was going to remain in power or be removed from office, 
indicated that 80% of the information he needed was found in open-source material.  
Information foraging theory (Pirolli & Card, 1998; Pirolli & Card, 1999) is being applied in 
this research on tasks that involve information-intensive work where the approach is to 
analyze the tasks as an attempt by the user to maximize information gained per unit 
time.  A computational model of the intelligence analysis process will be developed as a 
result of this CTA research and used to support tool prototyping and testing.  
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 The goals for the research described in this chapter are threefold.  One purpose 
of this first CTA phase is to yield “broad brushstroke” models of analyst knowledge and 
reasoning at a large grain size of behavioral analysis.  A second purpose of this 
research is to identify leverage points where technical innovations may have the chance 
to yield dramatic improvements in intelligence analysis.  A third purpose of the CTA 
phase is to guide the development of benchmark tasks, scenarios, resources, corpora, 
evaluation methods and criteria to shape the iterative design of new analyst 
technologies.  A CTA is typically used to identify the decision requirements, and the 
knowledge and processing strategies used for proficient task performance.  The 
following section presents a brief description of CTA and describes specific techniques 
that are representative of CTA methods.  
COGNITIVE TASK ANALYSIS 
 
CTA refers to a group of methods that are extensively used in naturalistic 
decision-making applications.  Klein's (2001, p. 173) definition of a CTA is "a method for 
capturing expertise and making it accessible for training and system design."  Klein 
delineates the following five steps:  (1) identifying sources of expertise; (2) assaying the 
knowledge; (3) extracting the knowledge; (4) codifying the knowledge; and (5) applying 
the knowledge.  System design goals supported by CTA include human-computer 
interaction design, developing training, tests, models to serve as a foundation for 
developing an expert system, and analysis of a team's activities to support allocation of 
responsibilities to individual humans and cooperating computer systems.  
Different CTA methods are used for different goals.  Our goals for conducting a 
CTA are twofold.  Our first goal is to capture data that will provide input to support 
development of a computational model of the intelligence analyst's processes and 
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analytic strategies.  Our second goal is to identify leverage points to inform the 
development of tools to assist analysts in performing the most demanding aspects of 
their tasks.  CTA extends traditional task analysis techniques to produce information 
regarding the knowledge, cognitive strategies, and goal structures that provide the 
foundation for task performance (Chipman, Schraagen, & Shalin, 2000).  The goal of 
CTA is to discover the cognitive activities that are required for performing a task in a 
particular domain to identify opportunities to improve performance by providing 
improved support of these activities (Potter, Roth, Woods, & Elm, 2000).  
 Our overall approach for the first phase of this research involves the following 
steps: review of the intelligence literature, use of semi-structured interviews, followed by 
the use of structured interviews and review of the results by subject matter experts 
(SMEs).  The second phase for this research, conducted in the summer of 2004, 
involved developing and comparing several alternative hypotheses based on material 
presented in a case study.  A prototype tool developed to assist the intelligence analyst 
in comparing alternate hypotheses was introduced and simulated tasks were performed 
to empirically evaluate the tool's effectiveness.  A follow-on study will involve the use of 
think-aloud protocol analysis while using a more advanced version of this tool.  This 
multiple-phase plan is in line with the approach employed by several successful CTA 
efforts (Hoffman, et al., 1995; Patterson, Roth, & Woods, 2002).  We are using a 
"balanced suite of methods that allow both the demands of the domain and the 
knowledge and strategies of domain experts to be captured in a way that enables clear 
identification of opportunities for improved support." (Potter, et al., 2000, p. 321). 
Types of activities that typically require the resource intensive analysis frequently 
required when conducting a CTA are those domains that are characterized as (i) 
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complex, ill-structured tasks that are difficult to learn, (ii) involving complex, dynamic, 
uncertain, and real-time environments, and (iii) sometimes include multitasking.  A CTA 
is most appropriate when the task requires the use of a large and complex conceptual 
knowledge base; the use of complex goal/action structures dependent on a variety of 
triggering conditions, or complex perceptual learning or pattern recognition.  Intelligence 
analysis involves all of these characteristics.   
When considering which knowledge elicitation technique is most appropriate, the 
differential access hypothesis proposes that different methods elicit different types of 
knowledge (Hoffman, Shadbolt, Burton, & Klein, 1995).  Certain techniques are 
appropriate to "bootstrap" the researcher and generate an initial knowledge base and 
more structured techniques are more appropriate to validate, refine and extend the 
knowledge base (ibid). A direct mapping should exist between characteristics of the 
targeted knowledge and the technique/s selected (Cooke, Salas, Cannon-Bowers, & 
Stout, 2002).   
A detailed, accurate cognitive model that delineates the essential procedural and 
declarative knowledge is necessary to develop effective training procedures and 
systems (Annett, 2000).  This entails building a model that captures the analysts' 
understanding of the demands of the domain, the knowledge and strategies of domain 
practitioners, and how existing artifacts influence performance.  CTA can be viewed as 
a problem-solving process where the questions posed to the subject-matter experts, 
and the data collected, are tailored to produce answers to the research questions, such 
as training needs and how these training problems might be solved (DuBois & Shalin, 
2000).  A partial listing of the types of information to be obtained by conducting a CTA 
includes factors that contribute to making task performance challenging, what strategies 
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are used and why, what complexities in the domain practitioners respond to, what 
aspects of performance could use support, concepts for aiding performance, and what 
technologies can be brought to bear to deal with inherent complexities.  
 
Use of Multiple Techniques   
 
Analysis of a complex cognitive task, such the intelligence analyst's job, often 
requires the use of multiple techniques.  When results from several techniques 
converge confidence is increased regarding the accuracy of the CTA model (Cooke, 
1994; Flach, 2000; Hoffman, et al., 1995; Potter, et al., 2000).  Flach (2000) 
recommends sampling a number of experts and using a variety of interviewing tools to 
increase the representativeness of the analysis.  During the initial bootstrapping phase 
of this research, several CTA approaches were examined with an eye toward 
determining which approach would be most productive for our domain of interest.  The 
remainder of this section describes two CTA techniques that were used for the initial 
phase of this research.  
Applied Cognitive Task Analysis Method.  Our initial set of interviews drew upon the 
Applied Cognitive Task Analysis (ACTA) Method (Militello & Hutton, 1998; Militello et al., 
1997) and the Critical Decision Method (Hoffman, Coffey, & Ford, in press; Hoffman, 
Crandall, & Shadbolt, 1998; Klein, Calderwood, & MacGregor, 1989).  The ACTA 
collection of methods was developed explicitly as a streamlined procedure for 
instructional design and development (Militello et al., 1997) that required minimal 
training for task analysts.  ACTA is a collection of semi-structured interview techniques 
that yields a general overview of the SMEs' conception of the critical cognitive 
processes involved in their work, a description of the expertise needed to perform 
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complex tasks, and SME identification of aspects of these cognitive components that 
are crucial to expert performance.   
 The standard ACTA methodology4 includes the use of three interview protocols 
and associated tools: (a) the Task Diagram, (b) the Knowledge Audit and (c) the 
Simulation Overview.  The ACTA Method uses interview techniques to elicit information 
about the tasks performed and provides tools for representing the knowledge produced 
(Militello & Hutton, 1998).  Discovery of the difficult job elements, understanding expert 
strategies for effective performance, and identification of errors that a novice might 
make are objectives for using the ACTA method.  The focus for researchers using the 
ACTA method is on interviews where domain practitioners describe critical incidents 
they have experienced while engaged in their tasks and aspects of the task that made 
the task difficult.  
Our use of the ACTA method produced valuable data for the initial bootstrapping 
phase of this research where the goal was to learn about the task, the cognitive 
challenges associated with task performance, and to determine what tasks to focus on 
during ensuing phases of the CTA research.  Products typically produced when using 
the ACTA method include a Knowledge Audit and a Cognitive Demands Table.  After 
conducting this first group of CTA interviews we opted to use a different method to 
capture the essence of the IA's job.  The IA's task places greater emphasis on 
deductive and inductive reasoning, looking for patterns of activity, and comparing 
hypotheses to make judgments about the level of risk present in a particular situation.  
We felt it was necessary to broaden the scope of the interview probes used with 
intelligence analysts.  
                                                 
4 Software available from Klein Associates provides rapid training plus interview materials for ACTA. 
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Critical Decision Method.  The Critical Decision Method (CDM) is a semi-
structured interview technique developed to obtain information about decisions made by 
practitioners when performing their tasks.  Specific probe questions help experts 
describe what their task entails.  CDM's emphasis on non-routine or difficult incidents 
produces a rich source of data about the performance of highly skilled personnel 
(Hoffman, Crandall, & Shadbolt, 1998; Hoffman, Coffey, & Ford, in press; Klein, 
Calderwood, & MacGregor, 1989).  By focusing on critical incidents, the CDM is efficient 
in uncovering elements of expertise that might not be found in routine incidents and 
helps to ensure a comprehensive coverage of the subject matter.   
Our use of the CDM was tailored to develop domain-specific cognitive probes 
that elicit information on how analysts obtain and use information, schemas employed to 
conceptualize the information, how hypotheses are developed to analyze this 
information, and the types of products that are developed as a result of their analysis.  A 
strength of the CDM is the generation of rich case studies, including information about 
cues, hypothetical reasoning, strategies, and decision requirements (Klein, et al., 
Hoffman, Coffey, Carnot, & Novak, 2002).  This information can then be used in 
modeling the reasoning procedures for a specific domain.   
In the remainder of this chapter we describe the development and use of an 
adapted version of the CDM and results derived from use of two CTA methods, ACTA 
and CDM. 
METHOD 
Procedures used to conduct the CTA, using ACTA and the CDM, are described 
in this section as study 1 and study 2, respectively.  In the first study we learned about 
the task, the cognitive challenges associated with task performance, and determined 
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what tasks to focus on during ensuing phases of the CTA research.  In the second study 
we revised the methodology and used a different group of IAs.  Interview probes were 
developed and used to conduct an adapted version of the CDM where participants were 
asked to describe a strategic analysis problem in lieu of a critical decision problem.  
STUDY 1 
Participants  
Six military intelligence analysts, currently enrolled in a graduate school program 
at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Monterey, CA, were interviewed for the first 
study.  Participants were contacted via e-mail with the endorsement of their curriculum 
chair and were asked to volunteer for this study.  (No rewards were given for 
participation.)  These U.S. Naval officers (Lieutenant through Lieutenant Commander) 
were students in the Intelligence Information Management curricula at NPS.   
Participants in both studies had an average of ten years experience working as 
intelligence analysts.  Thus, they were considered experts as the literature generally 
defines an "expert" as an individual who has over ten years experience and "would be 
recognized as having achieved proficiency in their domain" (Klein, et al., 1989, p. 462). 
Materials   
Study participants (study 1 and 2) had pen and paper, and a flip chart or white board.  
After a brief introduction to the study participants were asked to complete a 
demographic survey.   
Procedure 
The CTA process for all study participants took place in a small conference room 
at NPS. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with the first group of interviewees 
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where intelligence analysts were asked to recall and describe an incident from past job 
experience.  
ACTA. Domain experts were asked to draw a task diagram, to describe critical 
incidents they had experienced on their job, and identify examples of the challenging 
aspects of their tasks.  They were asked to elucidate why these tasks are challenging, 
and to describe the cues and strategies that are used by practitioners, and the context 
of the work.  Interviews were scheduled for one and one-half hours at a time that was 
convenient for each participant. Three interviewers were present for each of the first six 
interviews.  The interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed and the analysis was 
performed using the transcription and any other materials produced during the 
interview, e.g., task diagrams.  
This first group of intelligence analysts had a variety of assignments in their 
careers, however the majority of their experience was predominantly focused on 
performing analysis at the tactical level.  (Tactical level analysis refers to analysis of 
information that will impact mission performance within the local operating area, e.g., of 
the battle group, and generally within the next 24 hours.)  During this bootstrapping 
phase of our CTA effort, we learned that there are several career paths for intelligence 
analysts.  These career paths can be categorized as either having more of a technology 
emphasis where the focus is on systems, equipment, and managing the personnel who 
operate and maintain this equipment or an analytical emphasis where the focus and 
experience is on performing long-range, or strategic, analysis. 
Information gathered during the initial phase served as an advance organizer by 
providing an overview of the task and helped to identify the cognitively complex 
elements of the task.  The ACTA method produced valuable data for the initial phase of 
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this research.  After analyzing the data from the initial set of interviews, we determined 
that we needed to broaden the set of interview probes and tailor them for the specific 
domain of intelligence analysis to uncover the bigger picture of how intelligence analysts 
approach performing their job.  Thus, tailored probes were developed specifically for the 
domain of intelligence analysis.   
Concurrent with the decision to use an adapted version of the CDM was the 
decision to switch to a different group within the intelligence community, specifically 
analysts who had experience at the strategic, or national, level.5  National level 
intelligence is more concerned with issues such as people in positions of political 
leadership, and the capabilities of another country.  In contrast, at the tactical level, the 
user of intelligence information may only be concerned about a specific ship that is in a 
particular area, at a certain time; that is, the information will only be valid for a limited 
time.  Descriptions of experiences at the tactical level did not provide examples of the 
types of problems or cases that could benefit from the technology envisioned as the 
ultimate goal for this research.   
STUDY 2 
Participants  
Four military intelligence analysts from the National Security Affairs (NSA) 
Department were interviewed for the second study.  In the NSA curriculum there is a 
stronger analytical emphasis and the analysts have had experience with analysis 
assignments at the strategic level.  We were fortunate in that this second group of 
participants was very articulate in describing assignments where they had performed 
                                                 
5 The term 'strategic analysis' can have several definitions. We are referring to intelligence problems that have 
implications of strategic importance and those that require more time than is devoted to tactical questions, i.e., 
analysis tasks that require anywhere from several weeks to many months (or even years) to complete. 
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analysis of critical topics at the strategic level.  Several researchers have noted the 
issue of encountering problems with inaccessible expert knowledge (Cooke, 1994; 
Hoffman, Shadbolt, Burton, & Klein, 1995).  
Procedure 
Structured interviews were conducted with the second group of interviewees 
where intelligence analysts were asked to recall a strategic analysis problem they had 
worked on. Participants were asked to describe what they did step-by-step to gather the 
information and analyze it, and to construct a timeline to illustrate the entire analysis 
process. 
Modified Critical Decision Method 
 Many CTA techniques have been developed and used for tasks that involve the 
practitioner making decisions and taking a course of action based on these decisions, 
e.g., firefighters, tank platoon leaders, structural engineers, paramedics, and design 
engineers.  A goal  
for many CTA techniques is to elicit information on actions taken and the decisions 
leading up to those actions.  However, the IA's job does not fit this pattern of making 
decisions and taking action/s based on these decisions.  One finding that emerged 
during the initial phase of this research was that making decisions is not a typical part of 
the IA’s task.  The major tasks consist of sifting through vast amounts of data to filter, 
synthesize, and correlate the information to produce a report summarizing what is 
known about a particular situation or state of affairs.  Then, the person for whom the 
report is produced makes decisions and takes actions based upon the information 
contained in the report.   
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A modified version of the critical decision method (CDM) was developed and 
used for this task domain where the emphasis is on performing analysis (e.g., 
comparing alternative hypotheses) versus making decisions and taking a course of 
action.  Thus, interview probe questions provided in the literature (Hoffman, et al., in 
press) were tailored to capture information on IA's approach to gathering and analyzing 
information.  Domain-specific probes were developed to focus the discussion on a 
critical analysis assignment where the analyst had to produce a report on intelligence of 
a strategic nature.  Examples of such strategic analysis problems might include 
assessments of the capabilities of nations or terrorist groups to obtain or produce 
weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, strategic surprise, political policy, or military 
policy.  Interview probes were developed to capture information on the types of 
information used, how this information was obtained, and the strategies used to analyze 
this information.   
CDM.  A structured set of domain-specific interview probes was developed 
specifically for use with the second group of participants.  One interviewer conducted 
the initial interviews; each interview lasted approximately one and one-half hours.  Once 
the initial interview was transcribed and analyzed, the participant was asked to return for 
a follow-up interview.  All three interviewers were present for the follow-up interviews 
with this second group of intelligence analysts.  This approach, requiring two separate 
interviews, was necessitated by the domain complexity and the desire to become 
grounded in the case before proceeding with the second interview where our 
understanding was elucidated and refined.  
Deepening Probes.  Domain-specific cognitive probes were developed to capture 
information on the types of information the IA was seeking, the types of questions the 
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analyst was asking, and how this information was obtained.  Additional information was 
collected on mental models used by analysts, hypotheses formulated and the types of 
products that are produced.  Table 1 lists the questions posed to the participants during 
the initial interview. Topics for which participants conducted their analyses included 
modernization of a particular country's military, whether there would be a coup in the 
Philippines and the potential impact on the Philippines if there was a coup, and the role 
for the newly created Department of Homeland Security.  









What information were you seeking, or what questions were you asking? 
Why did you need this information? 
How did you get that information? 
Were there any difficulties in getting the information you needed 
from that source? 
What was the volume of information that you had to deal with? 
What did you do with this information? 





As you went through the process of analysis and understanding did 
you build a conceptual model? 
Did you try to imagine important events over time?  
Did you try to understand important actors and their relationships? 
Did you make a spatial picture in your head? 





Did you formulate any hypotheses? 
Did you consider alternatives to those hypotheses? 
Did the hypotheses revise your plans for collecting and marshalling 






Did you write any intermediate notes or sketches? 
 
 Follow-up Probes.  Once the data from the initial interviews was transcribed and 
analyzed, participants were asked to return for a follow-up interview.  The goal during 
this session was to elaborate our understanding of the IA's task.  The analyst was asked 
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to review the timeline produced during the first interview session and to elaborate on the 
procedures and cognitive strategies employed.  Probes used during the follow-up 
interview are listed in Table 3.   
Table 3.  Follow-up Probes Used for Modified Critical Decision Method 
 
 











Does this case fit a standard or typical scenario? 




Did this case remind you of any previous case or experience? 
 
Hypotheses and  
Questions 
 
What hypotheses did you have? 
What questions were raised by that hypothesis? 
What alternative hypotheses did you consider? 
What questions were raised by that alternative hypothesis? 
 
Information Cues 
for Hypotheses and 
Questions 
 
As you collected and read information, what things triggered 




What sort of tools, such as computer applications, did you use? 
What information source did you use? 
What difficulties did you have? 
 
 Probes included questions about the participants' goals, whether this analysis 
was similar to other analysis assignments, use of analogues, and how hypotheses were 
formed and analyzed.  Other probes asked about the types of questions raised during 
their analysis, methods used, information cues they used to seek and collate 
information, and the types of tools, e.g., computer software, they used to perform their 
analysis.  During this second interview we went through the same intelligence analysis 
problem with the goal of obtaining additional details to refine our understanding of the 
entire analysis process.  This included the types of information they used, and how they 
structured their analysis to answer the strategic question they had been assigned.   
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Cognitive Why Difficult Cues Strategies  Potential  
Demand  Errors 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Synthe-  •  Lack of technical  Difficult to know  Emphasize type of  • Potential for errors 
sizing        familiarity with how to weight  data analyst has  • Tendency to focus on 
data         different types of data  different kinds of  experience with,      type of data analyst  
•  Domain expertise is data and disregard       has experience with 
       needed to analyze  other data      and to ignore data you 
       each class of data        do not understand  
       (HUMINT, SIGINT,     
        ELINT, IMAGERY, etc.) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Synthe-  •  No one database exists Systems produce  Different • Users develop comfort  
sizing          that can correlate  different "results,"  commands rely            level with their system 
data     across systems e.g., mensuration on different           and its associated  
 •  No one database can  process produces  databases in which    database; this can lead 
        correlate all inputs  different latitude/ they have developed     to wrong conclusion 
         from many different  longitude coordi- trust    
         analysts to form one  nates from    
         coherent picture other systems   
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Synthe- •  Databases are cumber- Users don't always  Use own •  Rely on trend  
sizing           some to use:  Poor understand infor- experience            information  
data             correlation algorithms mation system   
 •  System presents results presents. Too many   
        that users do not trust, levels in system are  
        tracks are "out of whack." not transparent    
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Noticing •  Time critical information Need to decide  Need to rely on • Refer to other 
data            is difficult to obtain whether imagery other sources to    sources to verify  
 •  Need to assimilate, verify is current enough  verify current  
           and disseminate in a short to proceed with  
           time window strike 





A description of what has been learned during the first phase of this CTA research 
with intelligence analysts is presented in this section. 
STUDY 1 
 
The ACTA method was used with a group that primarily had experience at the 
tactical level of analysis, thus the discussion was focused on developing a product to 
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support operations at the tactical level.  Using the ACTA method, participants focused 
on providing descriptions of the cognitively challenging aspects of the task.  
Applied Cognitive Task Analysis  
The initial set of knowledge representations for the IA’s job (produced using the 
ACTA method) provided the basis for the more detailed CTA.  Table 4 presents an 
example of one of the formats used to codify the knowledge extracted during the CTA 
using the ACTA method.  This Cognitive Demands Table was produced based on 
analysis of data captured during an interview with one participant.  A Cognitive 
Demands Table provides concrete examples of why the task is difficult, cues and 
strategies used by practitioners to cope with these demands and potential errors that 
may result in response to the challenges inherent in the task.  
 
 Table 5 presents an example of a Knowledge Audit, which includes examples of 
the challenging aspects of the task and the strategies employed by experienced 
analysts to deal with these challenges.  A challenging aspect described by several IAs 
includes the need for the analyst to understand the capabilities and limitations of the 
systems employed for collection.  Understanding the systems' capabilities is important 
because the systems used to collect data and the tools used to process data can make 
mistakes due to conflicting databases, complexities of the system that are not 
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Table 5.  Knowledge Audit for Intelligence Analyst: NPS#4 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
EXAMPLE CUES & STRATEGIES WHY DIFFICULT? 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Collection  Ex:  Task involves much technical knowledge coupled with experience.  
    
Start formulating a picture Know what system can do/ limitations •  Need to understand systems to  
right away Constantly think about nature of the     assess validity of information 
 collection system •  All data is not 100% accurate 
 Ask:  What do I expect to see here? •  Collection systems and pro-  
 Constantly checking all data coming in    cessors make mistakes:  e.g.,  
  radar signatures can be similar 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Collection  Ex:  Need to question all data for validity  
Assess validity of information Correlate signals with what is already •  Deluged with signals in dense 
 Known.  Look for incongruent pieces    signal environment 
  of information.   
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Collection  Ex:  Constant pressure not to miss any little bit      
Huge amount of raw data Try to extend the area that is •  Analyst has to find the "little
 monitored to maintain wide area      jewels" in huge data stream 
 situation awareness   
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Collection  Ex:  Can't miss the radar contact which is the enemy coming out to conduct reconnaissance,  
or attack the battle group. Want to know 10-12 hours ahead of time when the enemy aircraft was coming. 
 
Under pressure not to miss anything Look at everything recognizing that  • Can't afford to let anything 
 probably 90% is going to be of no use.          slip by without looking at it 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Analysis:  Focus on what additional information is needed 
 
Multiple ways to obtain certain Think about what still need to know •  Need some familiarity with   
kinds of information     different types of sources 
  •  Requesting assets to get  
     information may be expensive  
     and conflict with other  
     ongoing things 
 •  Potential political ramifications  
        to requesting asset to get  
     something 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Analysis:  How to present information to customer 
Interpretation can be challenging Good analyst drives operations •  Need to ensure customer will  
Do not just pass all the information    take appropriate action as a  
 without some level of interpreta-    result of report 
 tion included. •  Are almost dictating what  
      customer is going to do 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Analysis:   Pressure to reduce the time to respond  
 
Analyst brings a lot of knowledge  What is the priority of this target vs. •  Things need to be  
to situation that goes beyond others that are out there?  interpreted in context 
sensor-to-shooter approach Is it the most important thing to  
 do right now? 
 What has occurred in the past week? 
 2 months?  2 years?  
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 




EXAMPLE CUES &STRATEGIES WHY DIFFICULT? 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Disseminate/ Provide Reports  Ex: Time-critical spot reports need to go out to people who need  
it right away  What does customer need to know •  Need to pass time-critical 
Pick out event-by-event pieces  information right away 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________    
 
Disseminate/ Provide Reports  Ex:  See something they don't expect, doesn't fit an established picture 
 
Times when event does not fit in  Try to develop coherent picture based •  Need to assess how this fits  
with what analyst has been on other things that have been occurring        into slightly bigger picture 
observing recently in past 1-2 hours.  
What do I think will happen in the •  More likely to discount  
next hour?  information if see something    
How does the last one event fit in with            you don't expect 
 all the other recent pieces? 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Disseminate/ Provide Reports  Ex:  See something outside a pattern of what expected  
  Always call operator :  "We saw X but •  Need to watch your back  
  here is why we don't think it is  (not look bad) 
  necessarily the truth."  Look for  
  reasons why it might not be correct 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Dissemination:  Push vs. Pull Technology 
 Simply pushing reports out to  •  High-level decisionmakers 
 people does not always work     want individual, tailored brief: 
 Pressure on analyst to ensure all      generates differential exchange 
 high-level decisionmakers have     of information 





 Another theme that was addressed by many study participants was the constant 
pressure not to let anything slip by without looking at it.  They described this aspect of 
their task as trying to find the "little jewels in the huge data stream," while knowing that 
90% of the stream will not be relevant.  An issue germane to analysis, also reported by 
several analysts, was the tendency to discount information when they see something 
they don't expect to see, i.e., to look for confirming evidence and to discount 
disconfirming evidence.  An additional pressure experienced by IAs is the need to 
ensure the customer will take appropriate action as a result of the report (i.e., you are 
"almost dictating what the customer is going to do.")   
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Cognitive Challenges  
The remainder of this section summarizes what was learned from the ACTA interviews.  
The IA task is difficult due to the confluence of several factors, including characteristics of the 
domain and the cognitive demands levied on analysts.  The following paragraphs describe the 
cognitive challenges involved in performing intelligence analysis.  
Time Pressure.  Decreasing timelines to produce reports for decision-makers is 
becoming an increasingly stressful requirement for analysts working at all levels, from 
tactical through strategic levels.  An example at the tactical level is provided by a 
participant who described how the effect of timeline compression coupled with 
organizational constraints6 can sometimes "channel thinking" down a specific path.   
An example of time pressure at the strategic level is provided by one participant 
(from study 2) who had six weeks to prepare a report on a matter of strategic 
importance when he had no prior knowledge of this area and he did not have a degree 
in political science.  The assignment involved the question of whether President 
Estrada, of the Philippines, would be deposed as President, and if so, would there be a 
coup?  This assignment was to include an analysis of what the impact would be on the 
Philippines.  Six weeks was the total time he had to gather all the necessary 
information, including the time needed to develop background knowledge of this area.  
He began by reading travel books and other ethnographic information.  This finding is in 
accord with those of Patterson, Roth, & Woods (2001), i.e., that analysts are 
increasingly required to perform analysis tasks outside their areas of expertise and to 
respond under time pressure to critical analysis questions. 
                                                 
6 This form of organizational constraint, that channels thinking, has been referred to as the "intelligence-to-
please" syndrome, a tendency to produce intelligence estimates that support current policy even though 
information indicates that policy is failing."  (Wirtz, 1991, p.8) 
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 Synthesizing Multiple Sources of Information.  One aspect of the IA's task that is 
particularly challenging involves merging different types of information — particularly 
when the analyst does not have technical familiarity with all these types of information.  
As an example, two analysts looking at the same image may see different things.  
Seeing different things in the data can occur because many factors need to be 
considered when interpreting intelligence data.  Each type of data has its own set of 
associated factors that can impact interpretation.  In the case of imagery data, these 
factors would include the time of day the image was taken, how probable it is to observe 
a certain thing, and trends within the particular country.   
 Multiple sources of disparate types of data (e.g., open source, classified, general 
reference materials, embassy cables, interviews with experts, military records, to name 
a few) must be combined to make predictions about complex, dynamic events — often 
in a very short time window.  To accomplish the data correlation process, analysts need 
to be able to combine seemingly unrelated events and see the relevance.  The cognitive 
challenges involved in synthesizing information from these different sources and 
distilling the relevance can be especially difficult, particularly when different pieces of 
data have varying degrees of validity and reliability that must be considered.  
Furthermore, domain expertise is often needed to analyze each type of data.  
 Human intelligence, electronic intelligence, imagery, open source intelligence, 
measures and signals intelligence can all include spurious signals or inaccurate 
information due to the system used or to various factors associated with the different 
types of data.  Analysts described situations where they gave greater weight to the 
types of information they understood and less weight to less understood types of 
information. They acknowledged this strategy could lead to incorrect conclusions.  
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Coping with Uncertainty.  Regarding data interpretation, a strong relationship 
typically exists between the context in which data occurs and the perspective of the 
observers.  This critical relationship between the observer and the data is referred to as 
context sensitivity (Woods, Patterson, & Roth, 2002).  The relationship between context 
and the perspective of the observer is an essential aspect of the data interpretation 
process.  People typically use context to help them determine what is interesting and 
informative, and this, in turn, influences how the data are interpreted.  Context 
sensitivity is the framework a person uses to determine which data to attend to and this, 
in turn, will determine how the data are interpreted.  This relationship between context 
and data interpretation is the crux of the problem for intelligence analysts:  When high 
levels of uncertainty are present regarding the situation, the ability to interpret the data 
based on context sensitivity is likely to be diminished. 
High levels of ambiguity associated with the data to be analyzed produce an 
uncertain context in which the analyst must interpret and try to make sense of the huge 
data stream.  For instance, data that appear as not important might be extremely 
important in another situation, e.g., when viewed from a different perspective to 
consider a competing hypothesis.  In general, people are good at being able to focus in 
on the highly relevant pieces of data based on two factors: properties of the data and 
the expectations (italics added) of the observer. (Woods, et al).  However, this critical 
cognitive ability may be significantly attenuated for professionals in the intelligence 
community, as they may not always have the correct "expectations" while conducting 
their search through the data due to the inherent uncertainty associated with the data.   
 High Cognitive Workload.  One of the most daunting aspects of the IA's job is 
dealing with the high cognitive workload that is produced when a constant stream of 
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information must be continuously evaluated, particularly when the information often 
pertains to several different situations.  Relevant items must be culled from the continual 
onslaught of information, then analyzed, synthesized and aggregated.  An additional 
contributor to the high workload is the labor-intensive process employed when an 
analyst processes data manually — as is often the case — because many tools 
currently available do not provide the type of support required by analysts.  For 
example, no one single database exists that can correlate across the various types of 
data that must be assimilated.   
 IAs often wind up synthesizing all the information in their head, a time-consuming 
process that requires expertise to perform this accurately, and something that is very 
difficult for a junior officer to do.  Moreover, it is stressful to perform the analysis this 
way because they worry about missing a critical piece of data and doing it correctly: 
"Am I missing something?" and "Am I getting the right information out?"  
 IAs must assess, compare, and resolve conflicting information, while making 
difficult judgments and remembering the status of several evolving situations.  These 
cognitive tasks are interleaved with other requisite tasks, such as producing various 
reports or requesting the re-tasking of a collection asset.  A request to gather additional 
information will often involve use of an asset that is in high demand.  Re-tasking an 
asset can be costly and may conflict with other demands for that asset, thus, tradeoffs 
must be made regarding the potential gain in information when re-tasking the asset to 
satisfy a new objective.  Potential political ramifications of requesting an asset to obtain 
data to satisfy an objective must also be considered.    
 Potential for Error.  The high cognitive workload imposed on IAs introduces a 
potential for errors to influence interpretation.  For instance, the potential for “cognitive 
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tunnel vision” to affect the analysis process is introduced by the high cognitive load that 
analysts often experience.  As an example, they may miss a key piece of information 
when they become overly focused on one particularly challenging aspect of the 
analysis.  Similarly, the analysis process may be skewed when analysts attempt to 
reduce their cognitive load by focusing on analyzing data they understand and 
discounting data with which they have less experience.  Additionally, discrepancies 
regarding interpretation may result when decision-makers at different locations (e.g., on 
different platforms, different services) rely on systems that produce different results.  
Moreover, the sheer volume of information makes it hard to process all the data, yet no 
technology is available that is effective in helping the analyst synthesize all the different 
types of information. 
 Data Overload.  While data overload is a relatively new problem for the intelligence 
community, it is a major contributor to making the task difficult.  It was once the case 
that intelligence reporting was very scarce, yet with technology advances and electronic 
connectivity it has become a critical issue today.  A former Marine Lieutenant General, 
describing the situation in the 1991 Persian Gulf conflict commented on the flow of 
intelligence: "It was like a fire hose coming out, and people were getting information of 
no interest or value to them, and information that was (of value) didn't get to them."  
(Trainor, in Bodnar, 2003, p. 55).  Data overload in this domain is attributed to two 
factors.  The explosion of accessible electronic data coupled with a Department of 
Defense emphasis on tracking large numbers of 'hot spots' that place analysts in a 
position where they are "required to step outside their areas of expertise to respond 
quickly to targeted questions," (Patterson, et al., 2001, p. 224).   
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 Complex Human Judgments.  Difficult human judgments are entailed when (i) 
considering the plausibility of information, (ii) deciding what information to trust, and (iii) 
determining how much weight to give to specific pieces of data.  Each type of data has 
to be assessed to determine its validity, reliability, and relevance to the particular event 
undergoing analysis.  Analysts must also resolve discrepancies across systems, 
databases, and services when correlation algorithms produce conflicting results or 
results that users do not trust.  Evidence must be marshaled to build their case or to 
build the case for several competing hypotheses and then to select the hypothesis the 
analyst believes is most likely.  Assessing competing hypotheses involves highly 
complex processes.  
 Insufficient Tools.  The sheer volume of information makes it hard to process all 
the data, yet the tools currently available are not always effective in helping the analyst 
assimilate the huge amount of information that needs to be analyzed and synthesized.  
Many of the systems and databases available to analysts are cumbersome to use due 
to system design issues.  For example, users don't always understand information 
presented by the system, i.e., when there are discrepancies across system databases 
(within the ship, within the service, or across services) or the system presents results 
that users do not trust, e.g., tracks that don't make sense.  Tools currently available for 
use by analysts include poor correlation algorithms and have too many levels within the 
system that are not transparent to the user.   
 Organizational Context.  Several themes related to organizational context emerged 
from the interviews.  The first involves communication between the analyst and their 
"customers" (a term used to refer to the person for whom the report or product is 
produced).  When the customer does not clearly articulate his or her need — and 
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provide the reasons they need a specific item — the analyst has an ill-defined problem.  
When the analyst does not have an understanding of the situation that merits the 
intelligence need this will make it more difficult for the analyst to meet the analysis 
requirement/s.  A second organizational context issue is that a goal for analysts is to 
ensure that all high-level decisionmakers are given the same picture, or information.  
Yet, high-level decisionmakers will often demand an individual, tailored brief.  This 
generates a differential exchange of information between the analyst and various 
decisionmakers.   
 Organizational constraints are placed on analysts to maintain the "status quo," 
such that new information is filtered through a perspective of being considered as not 
falling outside of normal operations.  There is pressure not to be "the boy who cried 
wolf."  This is in accord with other findings (Vaughan, 1996) who describe organizations 
that engage in a "routinization of deviance, as they explain away anomalies and in time 
come to see them as familiar and not particularly threatening." (Klein, et al., this 
volume).  Finally, there is a perception among analysts of feeling unappreciated for their 
work: Because people often do not understand what is involved there is a perception 
among IAs that people question "why do we need you?"  This credibility issue results in 
part because different data in different databases produce discrepancies.  Intelligence 
officers feel they loose credibility with operational guys because of these system 
differences.  We now turn the discussion to present results from analysis of data 
gathered using the modified CDM. 
STUDY 2 
 The modified CDM method was used with a group of analysts who had 
experience working on analysis problems at the strategic level.  When using the CDM, 
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the emphasis was on having IAs describe tasks where the focus was on analysis of 
intelligence in order to produce a report to answer a question of strategic interest.  The 
length of time our second group of interviewees had devoted to the assignments that 
they described ranged from six weeks to three and one-half years (in the latter case, 
this time was spent intermittently, while serving on a US Navy ship followed by 
attending graduate school at NPS). 
Example 1: Likelihood of a Coup in the Philippines 
 In this example the person described his task of having to build a brief to answer 
a political question regarding whether President Estrada would be deposed from the 
Philippines, whether there would be a coup, and if there was a coup, what the 
implications would be for the Philippine Islands?  What would be the implications for the 
US?  He was asked to complete this analysis task within a time span of six weeks on a 
topic that was outside his base of expertise (i.e., the geo-political area).   
 From the initial search of raw reports he produced an initial profile of what was 
known.  Many additional searches and follow-up phone calls were conducted to fill in 
the gaps in his knowledge and to elaborate on what was learned during the initial set of 
queries.  This step resulted in producing a large number of individual word files on each 
political person or key player.  These included biographies on approximately 125 
people, including insurgency leaders, people in various political groups, people with ties 
to crime, etc.  The information in these files was then grouped in various ways to 
consider several hypotheses.  Next he developed a set of questions to use to work 
backwards to review all the material from several different perspectives to answer a 
series of questions related to the main question of interest: Will there be a coup?  Will it 
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be peaceful or not?  Will it be backed by the military?  Will the vote proceed, or will the 
military step in, prior to the vote?  What is the most likely scenario to pan out? 
Schemas   
A schema is a domain-specific cognitive structure that directs information search, 
guides attention management, organizes information in memory and directs its retrieval, 
and becomes more differentiated as a function of experience.  Schemas are a way of 
abstracting the information that has been found so far into a representation.  The 
schema summarizes the external information by abstracting and aggregating 
information and eliminating irrelevant information.  Schemas are structured to efficiently 
an effectively support the task in which they are embedded.    
Figure 2 depicts the schema used to represent the dual-problem space of various 
information sources that the analyst researched to develop a comprehensive 
understanding of the issue.  The analyst began, in week one, by reading general 
background information to develop knowledge on the history and cultural ethnography 
of the country and also by examining prior Naval Intelligence on the previous history for 
political turnover in the Philippines.  During week two he began contacting Intelligence 
Centers and reading U.S. Embassy cables, an important source for this particular topic.  
Although this step provided valuable information, because this material was from a 
secondary source it had to be corroborated.  Thus the analyst had to decide which of 
these reports were to be given greater emphasis and in which reports he did not have 
much confidence.  
One way the analyst structured his analysis was to sort people according to 
whether they were pro-Estrada or anti-Estrada, which figures would be likely to drop 
allegiance to the constitution, and so on.  The analyst structured, and re-structured, all 
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the information to see how it might support various scenarios associated with the 
analysis questions.  For example, if the US invests money, will the country remain 
stable?  How should the US react?  What is the most dangerous potential outcome?  
Most/ least likely?   
The analyst had five hypotheses that he used to organize his material.  Previous 
coup attempts that occurred around the time of past-President Aquino were reviewed to 
examine how the allegiance of these people who were involved in past coup attempts 
might develop.  Voting records provided another way to sort people.  For a portion of his 
analysis he used nodal analysis software to examine relationships between people.  He 
used a whiteboard to play "20 questions" to come up with new questions to pursue.  
Relationship diagrams were constructed for each scenario and tables were developed 
to facilitate comparison of hypotheses.  Many other sources were examined, such as 
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Figure 2.  Information Foraging:  Dual Problem Space 
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Figure 3 depicts the information schema used by this analyst.  Multiple ways of 
grouping people were used by the analyst to consider competing hypotheses on how 
their allegiance would “fall out” based on their various associations.  This analyst 
grouped key people in both the military and civilian sectors according to their military 
associations, political, family, geographic region, and various other associations, e.g., 
professional groups and boards they belonged to, to try to ascertain their loyalty.  The 
analyst developed many branches and sequels between people and events in his 







     MILITARY      POLITICAL    OTHERS 
        ARMY      SENATORS          ORGANIZED CRIME 
           REGION 1     CLERGY               PRESS 
              <Commander> PREV COUP PLOTTERS     PROMINENT  
•FAMILIES 
          <Assistants>     POLITICAL PARTIES     INVOLVED SOME WAY 
       REGION 2     POLITICAL ACTION GRPS 
          <Commander>  POLITICAL FRONT ORGS   
          <Assistants>     
       . . . 
       LOGISTICS 
       INTEL 
       PERSONNEL 
       AIR FORCE 
      . . . 
•CLIQUE ASSOCIATIONS  " SOURCES   " ATTITUDES 
     SAME UNIT                GENERAL LIT        PRO-AQUINO 
     SAME REGION OF ORIGIN         JICPAC                ANTI-AQUINO 
     CLASSMATES                 CABLES 
     FAMILTY RELATIONSHIP          WEBSITES 
     PAST CO-PLOTTER            EXPERTS 
     BOARD CO-MEMBERSHIP 
     BUSINESS TIES 
 




 Section 1: Cognitive Task Analysis of Intelligence Analysts 43 
 
Example 2:  Modernization of Country X's Military  
 This analysis problem evolved as a result of a discrepancy the analyst observed 
between the stated political military objectives of country X and the observations made 
by this analyst during a six-month deployment on an aircraft carrier.  During his time as 
strike-plot officer he spent a lot of time collecting and sifting through raw message traffic 
and interpreting its meaning for the Battle Group.  He had developed a considerable 
knowledge base for this part of the world and was aboard the carrier during the EP-3 
crisis, in 2001, when it landed on Hainan Island.  During the EP-3 crisis, he was able to 
provide background information on what had been occurring up to that point as well as 
during the crisis.   
 When this analyst reported to NPS to focus on Asia he noticed a disconnect 
between what professors described in terms of this country’s political stance and things 
he had observed, while operating in this part of the world.  Things discussed in his 
courses were incongruent with the types of military training exercises he had observed 
this country engage in and the types of military equipment acquisitions made by this 
country.  He began with two or three factors that he knew could be used to support a 
separate hypothesis to explain the incongruity between what the political leaders are 
saying and what they are doing.  His task was to compare the publicly stated policy of 
country X regarding their planned military modernization with other possible scenarios 
for how things might evolve.   
 This analysis was based on a comparison of this country's officially stated military 
policy with data collected during detailed observations, and the associated daily 
reporting, that occurred over a six-month period while the analyst was onboard the 
aircraft carrier.  Table 6 presents a Cognitive Demands analysis of this IA problem.  For 
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analysis of this intelligence problem, the Cognitive Demands analysis described in the 
ACTA methodology was modified to represent the process that was used by this 
analyst.  Since intelligence analysis involves an iterative process of data analysis and 
additional collection, we arranged the table to focus on specific data inputs and outputs.  
Additional columns include cues that generate processes that operate on data, and the 
strategies or methods used by the analyst to achieve goals when working with specific 
inputs and outputs.  In addition, the table includes expert assessments of why specific 
inputs and outputs might be difficult.  This provides indications of potential leverage 
points for system design.  Finally, the table records specific examples mentioned by the 
analyst.  These examples might be used as task scenarios to guide design and 
evaluation of new analyst strategies.  
Analysis for this task included building the case for several other possible military 
scenarios regarding actions that might be taken by this country in the future.  A 
comprehensive analysis of two competing hypotheses was developed to take into 
account future changes in political leadership, the economy, and sociopolitical factors.  
Data obtained on factors including economic stability, system acquisitions, and military 
training exercises conducted were manually coded on a daily basis, placed in a 
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Table 6.  Cognitive Demands Table for Case 2:   
Develop Competing Hypothesis Regarding Military Modernization Efforts of Country X 
Inputs Outputs Cues/Goals Strategy Why Difficult?  Examples 
Observations that 
support hypothesis 
that country X has 
embarked on a 
different 
modernization effort 
for a number of years. 
Data files that depict 
country X's trends 
Compare stated 
modernization policy 
and economic trends 
within the country 
Evaluate the political 
land-scape of country 
X, by examining 
economic and cultural 
shifts in leadership to 
gain insight into ways 
they are looking to 
modernize. 
Stated (public) policy 
says one thing: 
Observations point to 
potentially very 
different goals. 





modernization efforts  
Determine country 
X's military capability 
to conduct precision 
strike 




To consider other 
possibilities beyond 
their stated military 
modernization goals 




purchases, etc. to see 
a different 
perspective, 
supported with data 
Many prior products: 
Intel- ligence sources, 
e.g., unclassified 
writings, interviews 





activities and stated 
policy. 
Notice discrepancies 
between stated policy 
and observed activity 
Match up things seen 
in open press with 
what is occurring 
militarily 
How do observations 
relate to each other 
and to the stated 
policy? 
Stated policy of 
country X does not 







of deployments and 
experi-ences from 
past deployment 
Data files of detailed 
observations gathered 
over a 6-month period 
Help operational side 
of Navy  explore a 
different view that is 
not based on 
established norms of 
thought 
Avoid "group think."  
Despite the mountain 
of evidence to the 
contrary, you don't 
want to "spool people 
up." 
Difficult to distill the 
relevance of the 
informa-tion:  Take 
100 reports and find 
the five gems. 
Tendency is to report 
every-thing and treat 
everything as of equal 
importance 
Read message traffic 
all day 
Two seemingly 
unrelated events are 
reported on 
individually 
Take analysis to next 
level of what is 
occurring 
Ask:  "Does this 
make sense?" 
Answer question:   










constrained to the 
geographic area 
Graphs to depict 
trends of different 
types of activity 
Factor in Army or 
ground troop 
movement in addition 
to Navy activity 
Classify infor- mation 
as relevant or 
irrelevant. 
Maintain data-bases 
of activity, e.g., by 
day/ week/ months 
Several hours a day 
sorting through 
message traffic;  
If had a crisis would 
be completely 
saturated. 
Group all different 
categories of activity, 
e.g., local activity, 
aggressive activity, 
exercise activity 
Read every-thing can 
find 
1. Brief for the 
Commander each day 
2.  Daily Intel 
Analysis Report 
Pick out things that 
are relevant 
Take raw message 
traffic (w/o anyone's 
opinion associ-ated 
with it)  
Databases do not 
match up 
(even capabilities 
listed in them) 
Extract what think is 
relevant and highlight 




activities that did not 
match up with what 
others believed 
Form a model of the 
situation; imagine 
events over time 
To force people to 
look at a different 
possibility  
Build "Perry Mason" 
clinch argument 
Organization-al 
constraints not to "go 
against the grain" 
Had lots of 
documented real 
world observations 









understand who is 
driving what action 
New leadership 
person is still 
"driving" things:  
Added credibility to 
thesis that there is a 
split 
Could not get access 




capabilities listed in 
different databases 





Build timeline to 
depict more 
aggressive posture  
West will not have 
same influence on 
economy which leads 
to political unrest: 
Political rivalry 
between old/ new 
leadership 
Describe political 
factors that could set 
off a change in 
direction.  Set stage 
for how things could 
go in a fictional 
scenario  





When presented brief 
on threat, operational 
personnel did not 
perceive information 
as representative of a 
threat. 
Difference between 
what they're saying 
and what they're 
doing 
Revised hypothesis Initially 2-3 factors that 
will support a separate 
hypoth- esis from the 
accepted hypoth-esis on
what is transpiring. 




pieces of information 
to focus on 
Fact that found so 
many pieces to 
support hypothesis 
indicates hypothesis 
has to be considered 
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  For this intelligence problem the analyst was looking for evidence to build the 
case to support several competing hypotheses regarding future political-military 
scenarios.  Several types of information were viewed as indicative of the type of data 
that could be used to develop and substantiate alternative hypotheses and several 
methods were used to represent his analysis of the data.  For example, a timeline was 
developed that depicted the following information: (1) location of U.S. forces; (2) geo-
political landscape of the world; and (3) the economy, based on economic decline 
affecting industry in the country.  One scenario depicted a situation where the West 
would not have the same influence on the economy and the fallout will be some political 
unrest.  Political rivalry between the old and new leadership will ensue and the scale will 
tip to the negative side as a result of political factors that have "gone south."  
Congressional papers were used, in addition to all the information developed by this 
analysis, to write a point paper on an assessment of this country's military activity and 
the kind of threat he saw as a result of his analysis.   
Sensemaking 
Sensemaking describes one of the cognitive processes performed by the IA to 
understand complex, dynamic, evolving situations that are "rich with various meanings."  
Klein, et al, (this volume) describe sensemaking as the process of fitting data into a 
frame (an explanatory structure, e.g., a story, which accounts for the data) and fitting a 
frame around the data.  The story, or frame, adopted by the IA will affect what data are 
attended to and how these data items are interpreted.  When the IA notices data that do 
not fit the current frame the sensemaking cycle of continuously moving towards better 
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explanations is activated.  Sensemaking incorporates consideration of criteria typically 
used by IAs: plausibility, pragmatics, coherence, and reasonableness (ibid).  
Sensemaking applies to a wide variety of situations.  As Klein, et al, describe it, 
sensemaking begins when someone experiences a surprise or perceives an 
inadequacy in the existing frame.  Sensemaking is used to perform a variety of 
functions, all related to the IA's job, including problem detection, problem identification, 
anticipatory thinking, forming explanations, seeing relationships, and projecting the 
future (ibid).  
DISCUSSION 
Intelligence analysis is an intellectual problem of enormous difficulty (Wirtz, 
1991).   
Many opportunities for tool development to assist the processes used by IAs exist.  
Prototype tool development has begun and will continue in conjunction with the next 
phase of the CTA.   Because the ultimate goal is to develop a computational model of 
the IA's tasks, detailed data must be captured on analysts performing their tasks.  Use 
of process tracing methods, e.g., verbal protocol analysis, in conjunction with the Glass 
Box software, developed for the NIMD Program (2002), should provide a rich source of 
data to develop a detailed model of the IA's processes.  NIMD's Glass Box is an 
instrumented environment that collects data on analyst taskings, source material, 
analytic end products, and analytic actions leading to the end products (Greitzer, 2004)  
Use of an instrumented data collection environment in conjunction with think 
aloud protocol analysis will enable us to gather detailed knowledge about the 
knowledge and cognition entailed in intelligence analysis.  The next phase of this CTA 
will involve asking SMEs to perform an analysis task while thinking aloud.  This 
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technique typically provides detailed data concerning the mental content and processes 
involved in a specific task.   
Identification of an appropriate sample of problems or tasks is essential to ensure 
sufficient coverage of critical skills and knowledge.  The initial set of interviews was 
conducted to develop a foundation of knowledge regarding the IAs' task domain.  During 
the next phase of this research additional empirical data will be gathered to further 
refine the CTA model of intelligence analysis.  
 Our next phase for this research will involve knowledge elicitation by observing skilled 
practitioners performing an analysis task using open-source literature.  Working within a system 
development process, to support critical system design issues, additional data and empirical evidence will 
be collected.  The CTA process is an iterative process that builds on subsequent design activities.  New 
tools and training will impact the cognitive activities to be performed and enable development of new 
strategies.  One goal for this phase will be to predict the impact the technology will have on cognition for 
the intelligence analyst. 
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